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Abstract 
This paper examines wage differentials among medium-large (20 or more employees) wholly-
foreign multinational enterprises (WFs), joint-venture multinationals (JVs), state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and domestic private firms in Vietnamese manufacturing. The analysis 
focuses on 2009 because it is possible to examine wage differentials after accounting for the 
influences of two measures of worker quality, educational background and occupation. 
Simple comparisons in large samples of 11 industries combined indicate that averages wages 
in JVs were about 92 percent higher than in private firms in 2009, SOEs and WFs paid 57 and 
54 percent more than private firms, respectively. Corresponding, conditional differentials that 
control for the influences of worker education and occupation, as well as capital intensity, size, 
and shares of female workers, were substantially smaller, but positive and significant in large 
samples. Wage levels and differentials varied substantially among industries. Conditional 
differentials remained positive and significant for WFs and JFs in most of the 11 industries 
examined, but estimates of SOE-private differentials were insignificant in most industries. 
Robustness checks using 2007 data could not account for worker occupation, but revealed 
results similar to those for 2009. 
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1.  Introduction  
There is a growing literature indicating that foreign-owned multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) normally pay higher wages than domestic firms in host, developing economies. The 
most sophisticated studies to date have analysed manufacturing plants in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and accounted for the fact that multinational enterprises tend to hire relatively well-
educated workers and be relatively large and capital or input intensive compared to local 
plants (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter 2014; Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013).  These 
studies often found positive and significant wage differentials between foreign MNEs and 
local plants, even after controlling the influences of worker education and sex, as well as plant 
size and capital intensity. However, aside from limited evidence in Ramstetter and Phan 
(2007), Tran (2007), and Fukase (2014a, 2014b), there is very little evidence regarding wage 
differentials among firm ownership groups in Vietnam, which accounts for the influence of 
worker quality. This paper partially fills the gap in the literature by using data on worker 
quality that were unavailable in previous years to analyse determinants of wages in 
manufacturing firms in Vietnam’s in 2007 and 2009,.  
The relatively large role played by MNEs in Vietnam and Vietnam’s intensified emphasis 
on outward-oriented economic liberalization since the early 2000s  has generated interest how 
MNEs affect the local economy and local workers. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have 
traditionally been designated to control key capital-intensive industries. However, the 
promulgation of the Enterprise Law in 2000, the negotiation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
with the United States in 2001, the implementation of many commitments made under the 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2005 or 
shortly thereafter, and the implementation of further revisions to the Enterprise Law and 
related Investment Laws that eventually led to WTO (World Trade Organization) accession in 
2006 were all substantive policy changes that reduced ownership-related policy biases in 
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Vietnamese manufacturing. Correspondingly, the economic environment during 2007-09, was 
substantially more open and competitive than even five years previous, and many firms were 
still in the process of adjusting to the large policy changes. During this period, firms were also 
affected by the world financial crisis, which was partially responsible for the decline of 
Vietnam’s economic growth rate to 5.4-6.4 percent in 2008-13 from the 6.8-7.8 percent that 
were experienced in 2000-07  (Asian Development Bank 2014).  
In this paper, we first review the literature on MNE-local wage differentials (Section 2) and 
describe the enterprise data that are used for the analysis, focusing on unconditional 
differentials in wages and worker skills between MNEs and private firms (Section 3). Then 
we test if wage differentials are statistically significant after accounting for firm size, capital 
intensity, worker sex, and worker education in both 2007and 2009 (Section 4). For 2009, it is 
also possible to control for the influence of worker occupation. The focus is on analysis of 
2009 data because they allow better control for worker quality, but the estimates for 2007 
provide an important robustness check. Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
2.  Literature review and Methodology 
There is a compelling theoretical rationale suggesting that MNEs will often pay higher 
wages than corresponding domestic enterprises in host developing economies. On the demand 
side, MNEs are often argued to possess large amounts of knowledge-based, generally 
intangible assets such as production technology, marketing networks and management 
systems. Possession of these firm-specific assets suggests that MNEs will be likely to be more 
efficient than non-MNEs, which is reflected by larger firm size, higher factor productivity, 
and/or correspondingly higher factor rewards.  
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Many MNEs also require their employees, even relatively unskilled staff, to have 
engineering, marketing, and foreign language skills required to work with particular 
machinery and clients. In addition, many of these employees need to learn modern work 
disciplines, such as punctuality, tidiness and promptness, which may not be valued as highly 
in local firms, for example. Firms operating in developing economies like Vietnam often face 
shortages of skilled workers who have both engineering, foreign language, and modern 
management skills. Thus, MNEs relative unfamiliarity with local labor markets may make it 
more difficult for them to hire new skilled workers, or retain current skilled workers than 
domestic firms. This may motivate MNEs to pay relatively high wages as an incentive to 
increase the attractiveness of their firms to skilled workers or to reduce turnover.  
On the supply side, workers may prefer to work for locally owned firms because they are 
more familiar with local management practices. In Vietnam, for example, it is clear that labor 
market practices often vary greatly between MNEs and local firms. Nonetheless, our 
impression is that most Vietnamese workers are not very opposed to working for MNEs and 
many might actually prefer MNE employment to the alternatives. This is supported by studies 
which suggest that internal migrants in Vietnam often prefer to work for MNEs over local 
firms (Fukase 2014b). 
Some of the most comprehensive analyses of wage differentials to date have examined 
Indonesian manufacturing plants in 1996 and 2006 (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter and 
Narjoko 2013). For 1996, estimates of Mincer-type wage equations at the plant level found 
strong evidence that MNEs paid higher wages than domestic firms after controlling for size, 
input intensity, the share of female workers, and worker education. For 2006, estimates in 
large samples of all manufacturing plants combined and a few individual industries also 
reveal positive and significant wage differentials, but many of the industry-level regressions 
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indicate that conditional wage differentials were not significant in the latter year.1 In addition, 
analyses of Malaysian plants in 2000-2004 also suggest that conditional wage differentials 
accounting for both worker education and occupation were positive and significant in most of 
the individual industries examined and when all sample industries were combined (Ramstetter 
2014). Although they do not control for the effects of worker education or occupation, other 
studies of  Malaysia (Lim 1977) and  Thailand (Matsuoka-Movshuk and Movshuk 2006; 
Ramstetter 2004) also found positive and significant wage differentials after controlling for 
plant-level differences in capital intensity and size, for example.   
Similar studies of Vietnam are sparse. Most of previous studies of wage differentials 
primarily focused on gender wage gaps, finding that women tend to earn significantly less 
than men (Liu 2001, 2004; McCarty 1999; Pham and Reilly 2007). Similar to this study, 
Ramstetter and Phan (2007) and Tran (2007), examined conditional wage differentials 
between MNEs and local firms in Vietnamese manufacturing during 2000-2005. Both studies 
found positive and significant wage differentials, but their measures worker quality (the 
shares of science and technical workers) were not as comprehensive as in the Indonesian or 
Malaysian data. More recently, the 2007 and 2009 enterprise surveys included more detailed 
questions on worker education, and the 2009 survey also has information on worker 
occupation. This study thus focuses on analyzing these years. A recent study by Fukase 
(2014a) used household data to compare the wages paid to workers in MNEs and domestic 
firms, also finding that MNEs and SOEs tended to pay higher wages than private firms and 
another study (Fukase 2014b) found that internal migrants were attracted by job opportunities 
in MNEs and SOEs.  
                                                 
1 In the combined sample of all manufacturing plants, intercept dummies are used to capture industry-
specific effects. The industry-level regressions are more general in that they allow intercepts and all slope 
coefficients to differ among industries 
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In Vietnam, ownership-related wage differentials are also related to government 
regulations, which require MNEs to pay higher minimum wages than private companies 
(Nguyen 2014). For example, in 2006-2007 minimum wages in WFs and JVs were 58-93 
percent higher than in domestic firms (private firms and SOEs combined), depending on the 
region. In 2009, these differentials declined to 38-50 percent. Foreign-domestic differentials 
in minimum wages were largest in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and smallest in rural areas. 
On the other hand, it is important to note that minimum wage requirements only affect base 
salaries, and domestic firms often pay much higher bonuses than multinationals. 2  As 
explained by Ramstetter and Phan (2007), SOEs were also required to pay relatively high 
minimum wages in previous years, though we have no new information on this point. 
 
3. The data, wage differentials and worker quality 
This study analyzes medium-large firms (20 or more employees) included in Vietnam’s 
Annual Enterprise Surveys for 2007 and 2009 (General Statistical Office 2011, 2013). To date, 
only these two surveys have collected comprehensive information on employee education and 
wages. The 2009 data also have information on worker occupation but this indicator is not 
available for the 2007. All values are expressed in 2000 prices using appropriate deflators.3 
Wages are defined to include regular salaries and other compensation such as bonuses, 
subsidies, social security, health insurance, and pension insurance. Real wages are calculated 
using the consumer price index (CPI). 
                                                 
2 See Appendix Table 7 and Asian Development Bank Institute newsletter of 23 October 2013; received by 
email on that date. 
3 Output is converted using a manufacturing output deflator at the two-digit level of Vietnam’s Standard 
Industrial Classification. Capital is converted using the deflator is for fixed-capital formation from the 
national accounts (General Statistics Office various years a, various years b). 
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Most MNEs, including both WFs and JVs, and SOEs are medium- or large-sized firms, 
which differ in many respects from smaller firms, which are predominantly private. Therefore, 
it is more meaningful to compare wages among medium-large manufacturing firms with a 
workforce of at least 20 employees. In addition to making the comparison more consistent and 
meaningful, excluding small firms also allows us to remove most outliers and most firms 
reporting implausible data.4 The analysis also excludes five industries with very few MNEs 
and/or SOEs (tobacco; publishing and printing; petroleum and gas; miscellaneous 
manufacturing; and recycling). 
After eliminating firms that were small, had implausible data, or were in one of the five 
excluded industries, 10,221 sample firms remained in 2007 and 10,698 in 2009. These sample 
firms employed 2.79 million paid workers in 2007 and 3.12 million in 2009 (Table 1). These 
totals were 74 and 76 percent, respectively, of total employment reported for manufacturing 
firms in enterprise survey publications (General Statistics Office (2011, 2013) but only 48-49 
percent of all manufacturing employees reported by the labor force surveys. In other words, 
although firms excluded from the samples were relatively small employers, there were a large 
number of manufacturing workers in units not surveyed by the enterprise surveys. Most were 
probably employed by household firms, which are excluded from the enterprise surveys.  
As mentioned above, the Enterprise Law was promulgated in 2000 and revised as part of 
the WTO accession process in 2005-2006, along with SOE and foreign investment laws. Thus, 
by 2007-2009, there was a consistent legal framework and common investment climate for all 
types of firms. However, Vietnam’s foreign investment law has been relatively open since it’s 
promulgation in 1987 and Vietnam’s policy implementation still favors both MNEs and SOEs 
                                                 
4 In addition, only limited information is collected from very small local firms with 10 or fewer employees 
(Jammal et al., 2006). 
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over private firms in many cases. Partially as a result of this legacy, MNEs and SOEs 
accounted for relatively large shares of paid employment in manufacturing firms (Table 1).  
However, reflecting efforts to privatize and equitize many SOEs, SOE shares declined 
markedly after 2000, while MNE shares increased. Table 1 indicates these trends continued in 
2007-09, with SOE shares of paid workers in the 11 sample industries declining from 13 to 10 
percent while the total MNE (JV+WF) share rose from 43 to 47 percent. WFs accounted for 
the vast majority of MNE employment, their share rising from 37 to 42 percent while the JV 
share fell slightly from 5.3 to 4.6 percent. WFs are concentrated in labor-intensive industries 
such as wood and furniture, apparel, leather, and footwear; and electronics. WF employment 
shares also exceeded one quarter in three relatively capital-intensive industries: transportation 
machinery, textiles, and basic metals and metal products.  
Of the 11 sample industries, paid employment was largest in apparel leather, and footwear, 
with 1.08 million paid workers in 2007 and 1.21 million in 2009, followed by food and 
beverages with 0.35 and 0.40 million, respectively, and wood and furniture, with 0.30 and 
0.31 million, respectively. 54 and 60 percent, respectively of the paid workers in the apparel 
group worked in WFs WFs were also large in the smaller electronic machinery industry, 
accounting for 72 and 80 percent, respectively, and the paid workers in this industry. These 
two industries accounted for two-thirds of the paid workers in WFs. At the other end of the 
scale, WF shares were relatively small in food and beverages (13 percent) and non-metallic 
mineral products (6.1-6.4 percent). JV shares were almost one-fifth in transportation 
machinery, but much smaller (6.4 percent or less) in the 10 other sample industries. In 2007, 
SOE shares were one fifth or more in textiles, chemicals, rubber, and plastics, non-metallic 
mineral products, and transportation machinery, but in 2009 this was only true in 
transportation machinery.  
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Table 2 presents unconditional wage differentials between WFs, JVs, and SOEs on the one 
hand, and domestic private firms on the other, for 2007 and 2009.  On average, JVs paid the 
highest wages; the mean JV-private wage differential was 175 percent in 2007 and 92 percent 
in 2009 when firms in all 11 industries were combined. For WFs and SOEs, mean 
differentials were 68 and 72 percent, respectively, in 2007, and 54 and 57 percent, 
respectively, in 2009. In other words, on average, JVs paid the highest mean wages in the 11 
sample industries, followed distantly by SOEs, and WFs, but all groups paid substantially 
higher wages than private firms. JVs also paid the highest wages in all 11 industries in 2007 
and in eight industries in 2009. In 2009, WFs paid the highest wages in the apparel group and 
WFs and SOEs both paid the most in paper and general machinery. Although WF-private 
differentials in were the smallest in samples of all 11 industries combined, WF-private 
differentials were the smallest in five industries in 2007 and three in 2009. On the other hand, 
SOE-private differentials were the smallest in six industries in both 2007 and 2009.  
Previous, plant-level evidence for Indonesia (Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013, Table 2) 
suggests a similar tendency for MNEs with large ownership shares (90 percent or larger) to 
have relatively small unconditional wage differentials compared to other MNEs. MNE-related 
wage differentials in Table 1 are also of similar as those for Indonesian production workers in 
2006, though they are considerably smaller than differentials for 1996 and for non-production 
workers in 2006. This pattern makes sense because most of the paid workers in the 
Vietnamese samples are production workers or non-production workers in relatively low-
wage occupations.  
The size of MNE-local wage differentials may also be related to the size of the technology 
gap between MNEs and private plants, which is likely to be smaller at higher levels of wages 
and incomes. There is also a similar, though less consistent tendency for WFs or MNEs with 
relatively large ownership shares to have relatively small labor productivity differentials 
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relative to local plants among ownership groups in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(Ramstetter 2004; Ramstetter and Phan 2013; Takii 2004; Takii and Ramstetter 2005). 
Another factor leading to wage differentials is the previously noted tendency Vietnam’s 
minimum, base wages to be highest in MNEs, though this difference is often offset by higher 
payments of other compensation in domestic firms and minimum wage requirements are 
probably not binding for many MNEs. 
When the 11 sample industries are combined, shares of paid workers who completed 
tertiary education were also higher in SOEs and JVs than in WFs and private firms in both 
years (Table 3). In JVs this share increased from 16 percent in 2007 to 17 percent in 2009, in 
SOEs the share increased from 13 to 17 percent, respectively. Corresponding shares in WFs 
and private firms also increased but were much smaller (5.9-7.3 percent). Although it is 
reasonable to expect tertiary shares to rise during this period, the large increase for SOEs 
suggests substantial differences in the SOE sample between the two years, perhaps reflecting 
the influence of privatization.  
There is also large variation in tertiary shares among industries (Table 3). For example, all 
ownership groups had relatively high tertiary shares in the chemicals group and electronic 
machinery, but relatively low shares in the apparel group. On the other hand, WFs and SOEs 
had relatively high tertiary shares in food and beverages, as did JVs in 2009, but tertiary 
shares were relatively low in private firms in both years. At the industry level, there are a 
number of other large changes in tertiary shares between 2007 and 2009 which suggest 
substantial differences in underlying sample firms in some industry-owner combinations.5 
                                                 
5 For example, tertiary shares increased or decreased by more than 6 percentage points for SOEs and JVs in 
the metals group, general machinery, and electronic machinery, JVs only in wood and furniture, and SOEs 
only in transportation machinery. Although these large changes are not impossible and there were large 
economic changes in 2007-09, variables like shares of workers by educational background don’t usually 
change much in a short period of time.  
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Mean shares of moderately educated workers (those who completed secondary education 
(e.g., high school or vocational training college, but not tertiary education) in all sample firms 
were larger than corresponding tertiary shares all ownership groups in 2007 and for private 
firms and WFs, but not for SOEs or JVs in 2009 (Tables 3, 4). Moreover, differences between 
secondary shares and tertiary shares tended to be relatively small, six percentage points or less 
in absolute value. This pattern contrasts sharply with Indonesia in 2006, for example, where 
secondary shares tended to be substantially larger (e.g., 10-20 percentage points or even 
more) than tertiary shares. The contrast partially reflects the relatively heavy emphasis 
Vietnam has placed on higher education at relatively low levels of per capita income.  
In addition to data on worker education, the 2009 survey also provides data on four types of 
worker occupations, two of which are highly paid, managerial employees, and professional, 
technical and supervisory employees. To further account for worker quality in this year, 
shares of these highly paid workers are also calculated (Table 5). In all 11 sample industries 
combined, SOEs and JVs also had the highest shares of high quality workers by this measure 
24 and 22 percent, respectively, but in WFs and private firms, these shares were only 16 
percent. Similar to tertiary shares, shares of highly paid workers were relatively large for all 
groups in the chemicals group and electronic machinery, in addition to the metals group, 
general machinery, and transportation machinery..  
 
4. Conditional wage differentials from econometric approach 
As emphasized in the literature, ownership-related wage differentials in the manufacturing 
sector are likely to be related to workforce characteristics such as education attainment and 
occupation. The literature also suggests that firm characteristics such as size, capital intensity, 
and the share of females in paid employees may also influence the extent of wage differentials. 
Therefore, in this section we continue with an econometric analysis to examine the extent to 
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which ownership-related wage differentials persist after controlling for the influences of 
worker education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm capital intensity and size. Similar to 
previous studies, we estimate the following model:  
ln൫ܴ ௜ܹ௝൯ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ ln൫ܭܫ௜௝൯ ൅ ܽଶ ln൫ܴ ௜ܱ௝൯ ൅ ܽଷܵܪ௜௝ ൅ ܽସܵܯ௜௝ ൅ ܽହܵ ௜ܲ௝ 
൅ܽ଺ܵܨ௜௝ ൅ ܽ଻ܦ ௜ܹ௝ ൅ ଼ܽܦܬ௜௝ ൅	ܽଽܦ ௜ܵ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝            (1) 
 
where 
RWij= Average real wage of firm i of industry j. 
ROij= Real output of firm i of industry j. 
KIij= Capital intensity of firm i of industry j, measured as the ratio of fixed capital 
stock over employment after deflating capital stock at a constant value. 
SHij= A share of highly educated employees in total employment of firm i of 
industry j (per cent).  
SMij= A share of moderately educated employees in total employment of firm i of 
industry j (per cent). 
SPij= A share of employees in highly paid occupation in total employment of firm 
i of industry j (per cent). 
SFij= A share of female employees in total employment of firm i of industry j (per 
cent). 
DWij= A dummy for wholly-owned, foreign-invested enterprises (wholly foreign 
firms – WF), taking a value of one if a firm is wholly owned FIE and zero 
otherwise. 
DJij= A dummy for joint venture enterprises (JV), taking a value of one if a firm is 
FIE joint venture and zero otherwise. 
DSij= A dummy for state-owned enterprises (SOE), taking a value of one if a firm 
is state-owned and zero otherwise. 
ߝ௜௝= A stochastic error term. 
 
All estimates also include vectors of dummy variables identifying six regions and as many as 
29 industries, usually defined at the two- or  three-digit level of Vietnam’s Standard Industrial 
Classification (VSIC) to account for region-specific and industry-specific influences on the 
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constant which are not captured by the firm-level variables.6 Industry-specific effects on 
constants and slopes are also accounted for in more detail by estimating equations for each of 
the 11 sample industries separately, as well as all 11 industries combined.  
  Coefficients on capital intensity (a1) and real output (a2) are expected to be positive because 
capital-intensive and large firms generally pay higher wages than labor-intensive or small 
firms. Coefficients on the shares of highly or moderately educated workers (a3, a4) and shares 
of highly paid workers occupations (a5) should also be positive because they suggest higher 
worker quality in firms with relatively high shares. In contrast, the coefficient on the share of 
female workers (a6) is likely to be negative because firms with a higher proportion of female 
workers tend to have lower average wages.7 Finally, if wage differentials between WFs JVs, 
and SOEs, on the one hand, and private firms, on the other, persist after controlling for worker 
education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm size and capital intensity, the signs of the 
coefficients on DW, DJ, and DS (a7, a8, a9) will be positive.  
Because data on worker occupation are only available for 2009, we focus on estimates for 
this year, but also provide estimates for 2007 without this variable as a robustness check. 
Estimates are performed in cross sections, which mean that the coefficients on DW, DJ, and 
DS (a7, a8, a9) can be interpreted as conditional wage differentials similar to the unconditional 
differentials in Table 2. However, it is also possible that wages could influence firm’s capital 
intensity and size, creating potential simultaneity between the dependent and independent 
variables. To check for the robustness of the results to simultaneity concerns, estimates of 
both contemporaneous and lagged specifications, where capital intensity and output are 
                                                 
6 The regions are the Hanoi, the Red River Delta, the North Mountainous Area, the Central Coast and 
Central Highland Area, the Southeast Area, Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta. Industries are 
defined to have at least two of each of the four ownership types.  
7 Females tend to earn less than males because they tend to be less educated and have less experience in 
high paying jobs, and because they are discriminated against in the workplace and when educational 
resources are allocated.  
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lagged one year, are compared. All estimates use robust standard errors to account for 
heteroskedasiticity that can be expected when firm-level, scale variables (e.g., output, capital 
intensity) are used.  
In large samples of firms in all 11 industries combined, estimated coefficients were always 
consistent with expectations for 2007 and generally consistent for 2009 (Table 6). In both 
years, coefficients on firm size, shares of highly educated workers, and female shares had the 
expected sign and were highly significant at the 1 percent level or better. Similarly, 
coefficients on capital intensity and the share of moderately educated workers were positive 
and highly significant for 2007.  For 2009, the coefficient on the share of highly paid workers 
was also positive and highly significant, and the coefficient on the share of moderately 
educated workers was also significant at the standard 5 percent level. However, the coefficient 
on capital intensity was insignificant in 2009. Nonetheless, the goodness of fit measure (R2) 
was about 0.48 for 2009 estimates and 0.42 for 2007, suggesting that the model explained the 
variation in the dependent variable rather well, given the cross sectional context. Moreover, 
the differences between the size of most coefficients, notable the coefficients on the 
ownership dummies, were similar in the contemporaneous and lagged specifications, 
suggesting that any simultaneity bias is likely to be small. 
Most importantly, the estimates suggest that MNEs and SOEs paid significantly higher 
wages than local firms, even after controlling for the influences of capital intensity, firm size 
as well as worker education, sex, and occupation. However, conditional wage differentials 
were all substantially smaller than corresponding unconditional differentials in Table 2. For 
example, conditional WF-private wage differentials were about 28-29 percent in 2009 and 23-
25 percent in 2007, JV-private differentials were 28-30 percent and 29-31 percent, 
respectively, and SOE-private differentials were 9-10 percent and 13-15 percent, respectively, 
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and that all of these wage differentials were highly significant statistically.8 These results are 
consistent with the patterns observed in Table 2 because they imply JVs pay the highest 
wages, followed by WFs, SOEs and lastly private firms. On the other hand, the conditional 
differentials were much closer in magnitude than unconditional differentials for WFs and JVs; 
in other words, the controls in equation (1) apparently explain a much larger portion of JV-
private wage differentials than of WF-private differentials. Nonetheless, Wald tests suggest it 
is statistically meaningful to distinguish JVs and WFs when estimating equation (1).  
Given substantial differences in the cross sections used, the lack of worker occupation data 
for 2007, and that fact that the capital intensity variable was insignificant for 2009, it is 
difficult to compare differentials between 2007 and 2009 meaningfully. Comparisons between 
the two years are further confounded by large differences in the macroeconomic environment 
in these two years. For example, the growth rate of real manufacturing GDP plummeted from 
over 12.4 percent in 2007 to 9.8 percent in 2008 and only 2.8 percent in 2009, while the 
growth of the manufacturing deflator skyrocketed from 4.5 percent in 2007 to 13.2 percent in 
2008 and 7.3 percent in 2009.9 On the other hand, the finding of significant, ownership-
related wage differentials in both years suggests they were an important feature of Vietnamese 
manufacturing which were robust to substantial macroeconomic change. 
Estimates of equation (1) also performed relatively well when estimates separately in the 11 
sample industries. For example, the goodness of fit measure always exceeded 0.4 in six of the 
11 industries and was below 0.3 in only one industry (the apparel group) in 2007. Coefficients 
on real output, the share of highly educated workers were positive and significant at standard 
levels in almost all estimates. Coefficients on the share of female workers were negative and 
significant in 19 of the 22 estimates for 2009, but only 14 for 2007. The coefficient on the 
                                                 
8 Because dependent and independent variables are in natural logs, conditional differentials are calculated 
as the exponential value of the relevant coefficients (a7, a8, a9) from estimates of equation (1). 
9 Data downloaded from www.gso.gov.vn on 22 January 2014. 
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share of highly paid workers was also significant in 14 of the 22 cases for 2009. On the other 
hand, coefficients on capital intensity and the share of moderately educated workers were 
almost never significant at the industry level. 
As with unconditional wage differentials, conditional wage differentials between WFs, JVs, 
and SOEs, on the one hand, and domestic private firms on the other, varied greatly among 
industries (Table 7). 10  WF-private differentials were positive and significant in all 11 
industries in 2009 and 10 of 11 industries (all except non-metallic mineral products) in 2007. 
WF-private differentials tended to be largest in general machinery (55-59 percent in 2009 and 
40-42 percent in 2007), the metals group (34 and 31-32 percent, respectively), transportation 
machinery (32-35 and 62-65 percent, respectively), the chemicals group (35 and 36-38 
percent, respectively), and textiles (38-40 and 28-29 percent, respectively). On the other hand, 
WF-private differentials were consistently small in the apparel group (21 and 10-11 percent, 
respectively).  
Conditional, JV-private wage differentials were also positive in 10 of the 11 industry 
groups (all except paper) in 2009 (Table 7). However, in 2007 differentials were insignificant 
at standard levels in four industries: the apparel group, wood and furniture, paper, and general 
machinery. The JV-private differential was also rather small in the apparel group in 2009, 
though it was positive and highly significant. JV-private differentials were significant and 
tended to be largest in both years in the chemicals group, electronic machinery, and the metals 
group in both years. Estimated differentials were also relatively large in textiles in 2009, but 
smaller in 2007, while the reverse was true in transportation machinery. Wald tests again 
indicate that it is usually meaningful to distinguish JVs and WFs when estimates of equation 
(1) are performed at the industry level. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix Table 5 for all slope coefficients and equation information provided for the 11 industry 
sample in Table 6. To conserve space, Table 7 only provides wage differential coefficients and results of 
testing the null hypothesis that JV-private and WF-private differentials were equal. 
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Although most WF-private and JV-private differentials were significant when estimated at 
the industry level, most SOE-private wage differentials were insignificant. There were three 
notable exceptions: food and beverages, the chemicals group, and electronic machinery. There 
was also some indication of positive and significant SOE-private differentials in 
transportation machinery in 2007 and in the apparel group in 2009 (lagged specification only). 
In other words, most of the unconditional, SOE-private differentials are apparently explained 
by differences in worker education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm-level capital intensity 
and size.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the extent of wage differentials among medium-large MNEs, 
SOEs, and domestic private firms in Vietnamese manufacturing in 2007 and 2009, following 
the numerous policy reforms that removed ownership-related biases and lowered protection 
from imports. When all sample firms were combined, simple comparisons suggest that 
average wages were 92-175 percent higher in joint venture MNEs than in private firms, while 
average wages in SOEs and wholly foreign MNEs were 54-72 percent higher than in private 
firms. Wage levels and unconditional wage differentials between JVs, WFs, and SOEs on the 
one hand, and private firms on the other, varied substantially among the 11 sample industries 
studied.  
Conditional wage differentials which account the influences of worker education, 
occupation, and sex, in addition to firm capital intensity and size on wage determination at the 
firm level were positive and significant for WFs, JVs, and SOEs when estimated in large 
samples of including all 11 industries. However, conditional wage differentials were much 
smaller than corresponding, unconditional differentials, 28-31 percent for JVs, 23-29 percent 
for WFs, and 9-16 percent for SOEs. Moreover, when conditional differentials were estimated 
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at the industry level, they were insignificant for SOEs in most industries. On the other hand, 
conditional differentials were significant in 10 of 11 industries for WFs in both years and for 
JVs in 2009, and in seven industries in 2007. The consistency of these results is important 
because 2007 and 2009 were two very different years and suggests findings of positive and 
significant JV-private and WF-private wage differentials is rather robust. 
Because the industry-level results indicate substantial differences in slope coefficients 
among industries, industry-level estimates of wage differentials are probably more accurate 
than results from large samples of all 11 industries combined. These results also suggest that 
industry-level differentials were more persuasive in Vietnam in 2007 and 2009 than MNE-
private differentials in Indonesia in 1996 and 2006 and MNE-local differentials in Malaysia in 
2000-2004. They are also consistent with results from studies of Vietnamese household data 
which suggest MNEs tend to pay relatively high wages and attract immigrants.  
In short, these results provide important support for previous studies indicating that MNEs 
often pay significantly higher wages than local firms or plants in Southeast Asia, even after 
accounting important aspects of worker quality and other firm- or plant-level characteristics 
affecting wage determination. These results suggest there are important benefits accruing to 
workers in MNEs and conversely provide important evidence that MNEs do not exploit their 
workers unfairly. On the other hand, they should not be construed as evidence that workers 
would be better off if the government were to promote MNEs at the expense of other 
ownership groups, because MNE-local wage differentials are related to firm characteristics 
that distinguish MNEs from non-MNEs. 
Although these results are important, further research in this area should seek to address a 
number of related issues. For example, how do changes in ownership affect wages and 
employment? Further investigation of this issue is particularly relevant in Vietnam because it 
can help illustrate the effects of privatizing SOEs. Another important question is how does 
18 
 
MNE presence affect wage levels in domestic firms or are there wage spillovers from MNE 
presence? Analysis of issues raised these questions requires the use of panel data, the creation 
of which is not straightforward in the Vietnamese case. 
 
References 
Asian Development Bank 2014, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2014, 45th Edition. 
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Fukase, E 2014a, 'Foreign Wage Premium, Gender and Education: Insights from Vietnam 
Household Surveys,' The World Economy, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 834-55. 
Fukase, E 2014b, 'Job Opportunities in Foreign Firms and Internal Migration in Vietnam', 
Asian Economic Journal, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 279-99. 
 
General Statistics Office 2011,  Business Results of All Enterprises in Vietnam in 2009, Vol. 1 
& 2, Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House and underlying firm-level data for 2007-2009 
supplied by the General Statistics Office. 
 
General Statistics Office 2013,  Development of Vietnam Enterprises in the Period of 2006-
2011, Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House and underlying firm-level data for 2006-2009 
supplied by the General Statistics Office. 
 
General Statistics Office various years a, Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004 issues, Hanoi: 
Statistical Publishing House. 
 
General Statistics Office various years b, Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam, 2005-2013 issues, 
Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House. 
 
Jammal, Y, Thang, DT and Thuy, PD 2006, "Vietnam Annual Enterprise Survey" Report of 
GSO/UNDP/DFID Project 00040722 "Support to Socio-Economic Development 
Monitoring", General Statistics Office, Hanoi. 
Lim, D 1977, 'Do foreign companies pay higher wages than their local counterparts in 
Malaysian manufacturing?', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 55-66. 
Lipsey, RE and Sjöholm, F 2004, 'Foreign direct investment, education and wages in 
Indonesian manufacturing', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 415-
22. 
Liu, AY 2001, 'Markets, inequality and poverty in Vietnam', Asian Economic Journal, vol. 
15, no. 2, pp. 217-35. 
Liu, AY 2004, 'Gender wage gap in Vietnam: 1993 to 1998', Journal of Comparative 
Economics, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 586-96. 
19 
 
Matsuoka-Movshuk, A and Movshuk, O 2006, 'Multinational Corporations and Wages in 
Thai Manufacturing', in ED Ramstetter and F Sjöholm (eds), Multinational corporations 
in Indonesia and Thailand : wages, productivity and exports, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, pp. 54-81. 
McCarty, A 1999, 'Vietnam’s Labour Market in Transition', in Law and Labour Market 
Regulation in Asian: proceedings of the Law and Labour Market Regulation in Asian 
University of the Philippines. 
Nguyen, KT 2014, 'Economic reforms, manufacturing employment and wages in Vietnam', 
PhD Dissertation thesis, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Pham, T-H and Reilly, B 2007, 'The gender pay gap in Vietnam, 1993–2002: A quantile 
regression approach', Journal of Asian Economics, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 775-808. 
Ramstetter, ED 2004, 'Labor productivity, wages, nationality, and foreign ownership shares in 
Thai manufacturing, 1996-2000', Journal of Asian Economics, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 861-84. 
Ramstetter, ED 2014, 'Exporting, education, and wage differentials between foreign 
multinationals and local plants in Indonesia and Malaysian manufacturing', in P 
Athukorala, et al. (eds), Trade, Development and Political Economy in East Asia Essays 
in Honour of Hal Hill, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Publishing, 
Singapore, pp. 112-33. 
Ramstetter, ED and Narjoko, D 2013, 'Wage Differentials between Foreign Multinationals 
and Local Plants and Worker Education in Indonesian Manufacturing', Working Paper 
2013-23, Kitakyushu: International Centre for the Study of Development. 
Ramstetter, ED and Phan, MN 2007, 'Employee Compensation, Ownership, and Producer 
Concentration in Vietnam's Manufacturing Industries', ICSEAD Working Paper 2007-
07, Kitakyushu: International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development. 
Ramstetter, ED and Phan, MN 2013, 'Productivity, ownership, and producer concentration in 
transition: Further evidence from Vietnamese manufacturing', Journal of Asian 
Economics, vol. 25, pp. 28-42. 
Takii, S 2004, 'Productivity differentials between local and foreign plants in Indonesian 
manufacturing, 1995', World Development, vol. 32, no. 11, pp. 1957-69. 
Takii, S and Ramstetter, ED 2005, 'Multinational presence and labour productivity 
differentials in Indonesian manufacturing, 1975–2001', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 221-42. 
Tran, TQ 2007, 'Foreign direct investment in industrial transition : a case study of Vietnam ', 
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. 
 
 
Industry All firms, number
SOE
 shares
WF
 shares
JV 
shares
All firms, 
number
SOE
 shares
WF
 shares
JV 
shares
11 sample industries 2,793,123 12.80 37.50 5.33 3,121,007 9.93 42.30 4.59
 Food & beverages 354,508 14.06 12.77 5.89 403,724 9.64 13.05 6.39
 Textiles 152,230 22.47 32.53 4.55 142,013 14.67 38.87 2.25
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 1,081,636 7.25 53.97 4.85 1,205,799 4.89 60.22 3.71
 Wood products & furniture 300,553 6.79 32.46 2.70 313,291 4.09 37.24 2.37
 Paper 57,452 15.73 19.99 0.81 62,779 12.73 24.16 0.68
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 186,057 20.81 29.99 4.96 212,183 15.47 36.62 3.40
 Non-metallic mineral products 197,056 22.65 6.17 5.50 215,953 19.11 6.41 4.41
 Basic metals & metal products 147,612 18.24 25.33 4.30 172,630 17.62 30.85 3.71
 General machinery 39,392 18.52 23.63 1.56 43,748 18.03 25.86 1.65
 Electronic machinery 155,360 7.48 71.74 6.31 193,414 5.09 79.65 4.78
 Transportation machinery 121,270 30.14 27.78 19.15 155,475 31.06 28.42 18.39
Excluded industries and firms 490,934 22.13 36.94 0.98 523,856 12.37 36.00 1.28
Table 1: Total paid employees in sample firms (number) and shares of SOEs, WFs, and JVs shares (% of industry 
subtotals)
Note: Samples include firms with 20 or more paid workers and positive sales, worker compensation, and fixed assets; 
excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, miscellaneous manufacturing, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
2007 2009
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2007 2009
Industry Private firms
SOE-
private
WF-
private
JV-
private
Private 
firms
SOE-
private
WF-
private
JV-
private
11 sample industries 12.85 72 68 175 14.49 57 54 92
 Food & beverages 11.63 92 59 167 14.90 54 83 88
 Textiles 11.28 36 62 77 11.71 40 62 84
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 12.12 4 24 24 12.53 15 39 30
 Wood products & furniture 11.54 28 40 67 11.72 18 53 67
 Paper 12.55 58 46 131 14.42 61 61 -5
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.68 123 134 230 17.13 82 66 86
 Non-metallic mineral products 12.03 71 42 231 14.10 78 67 107
 Basic metals & metal products 14.66 54 62 155 16.53 36 45 92
 General machinery 16.31 33 -1 79 18.30 32 31 28
 Electronic machinery 16.09 88 176 188 20.11 50 11 117
 Transportation machinery 14.63 73 5 168 17.63 18 24 72
Table 2: Mean compensation per worker in private firms (million dong) and unconditional ownership-related 
wage differentials (percentage differentials) for paid workers in sample firms
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; compensation refer to all payments to workers, 
including employer contributions to social insurance.
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Table 3: Shares of paid workers with tertiary education in sample firms (percent)
2007 2009
Industry Private SOEs WFs JVs Private SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 5.93 12.57 6.80 15.55 6.71 17.49 7.30 16.90
 Food & beverages 5.71 11.73 14.40 6.50 6.60 14.25 14.87 18.49
 Textiles 4.34 9.29 3.68 2.01 4.19 10.15 3.61 7.43
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 3.22 3.32 2.08 7.98 3.51 5.87 2.33 2.64
 Wood products & furniture 3.63 10.93 2.52 17.19 3.95 12.30 3.22 8.54
 Paper 5.63 9.88 6.65 18.49 6.20 9.65 6.24 16.84
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 9.85 17.03 11.47 15.34 10.24 22.59 11.72 17.02
 Non-metallic mineral products 4.01 11.01 7.97 19.13 5.01 15.69 10.51 17.57
 Basic metals & metal products 7.67 13.77 8.69 17.63 9.52 19.95 8.24 25.64
 General machinery 10.53 16.39 7.46 28.04 15.27 32.31 12.69 15.52
 Electronic machinery 13.21 21.00 9.11 13.83 17.13 31.07 9.31 32.80
 Transportation machinery 6.74 16.79 4.83 14.52 10.33 24.16 7.32 18.20
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; workers with tertiary education are 
those who successfully completed college, university, or graduate school.
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Table 4: Shares of paid workers with secondary education in sample firms (percent)
2007 2009
Industry Private SOEs WFs JVs Private SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 12.11 12.77 11.21 16.19 11.54 15.08 10.77 15.98
 Food & beverages 9.94 15.64 16.03 15.10 9.73 18.37 14.70 17.61
 Textiles 7.06 8.03 9.03 7.59 7.89 9.98 9.50 6.32
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 7.15 5.40 4.72 7.19 6.39 6.26 5.24 4.81
 Wood products & furniture 8.22 10.03 5.02 10.64 7.78 9.46 4.32 12.68
 Paper 12.00 10.86 11.06 21.21 10.65 11.22 9.93 27.78
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.97 14.64 14.62 19.37 14.53 14.90 12.98 17.60
 Non-metallic mineral products 8.78 11.77 10.15 17.93 9.74 11.84 15.47 21.42
 Basic metals & metal products 19.04 14.00 17.53 20.61 18.35 19.39 15.49 18.33
 General machinery 25.53 15.81 17.46 27.21 26.91 28.92 19.14 32.17
 Electronic machinery 26.09 16.40 15.01 20.43 23.33 17.49 13.04 18.70
 Transportation machinery 17.47 13.57 12.35 21.63 20.94 16.98 13.99 16.57
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; workers with moderate education are 
those who successfully completed secondary school (12 years), but not tertiary education.
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Industry Private SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 16.30 23.78 16.04 22.13
 Food & beverages 16.26 22.45 24.06 22.12
 Textiles 12.84 15.57 12.55 18.00
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 10.99 11.54 9.05 9.16
 Wood products & furniture 12.93 17.98 10.40 15.37
 Paper 16.83 15.88 16.02 31.62
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 21.52 27.32 21.52 24.87
 Non-metallic mineral products 14.30 22.31 18.83 22.23
 Basic metals & metal products 20.70 25.34 18.65 29.73
 General machinery 25.95 43.86 21.76 26.57
 Electronic machinery 25.50 33.06 16.95 27.23
 Transportation machinery 20.39 30.51 18.91 27.20
Table 5: Shares of workers in highly paid occupation in sample firms in 2009 (percent)
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
Note: See Table 1 for a precise definition of sample firms; highly paid occupations are 
defined as (1) managers and (2) professional, technical and supervisory employees. 
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Independent variable, 
indicator
KI 0.0106 0.0034 0.0374 a 0.0114 a
RO 0.1817 a 0.1378 a 0.1955 a 0.1378 a
SH 0.0091 a 0.0089 a 0.0144 a 0.0143 a
SM 0.0008 b 0.0008 b 0.0014 a 0.0014 a
SF -0.0036 a -0.0036 a -0.0036 a -0.0035 a
SP 0.0035 a 0.0035 a not available
DW 0.2553 a 0.2502 a 0.2202 a 0.2071 a
DJ 0.2605 a 0.2492 a 0.2718 a 0.2543 a
DS 0.0974 a 0.0864 a 0.1456 a 0.1289 a
Test DW=DJ 247.56 a 239.95 a 111.57 a 99.54 a
Observations 10,698 10,698 10,221 10,221
R2 0.482 0.480 0.423 0.419
#industry dummies 28 28 28 28
Notes: a=signficant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 
10% level; all estimates include 5 regional dummies and 53 industry dummies (see the 
text for definitions); theTestDFs rows show Wald tests of the hypothesis that 
coefficients on DW and DJ are equal and associated p-values; full results including the 
constant and all dummy coefficients are available from the authors.
2009 2007
Lagged Contem-poraneous Lagged
Contem-
poraneous
Table 6: OLS Estimates of slope ownership-related wage differentials and other slope 
coefficients from estimates of equation (1); all p-values based on robust standard 
errors; 11 sample industries combined
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WF-private, 11 industries 0.2553 a 0.2502 a 0.2202 a 0.2071 a
  Food & beverages 0.2413 a 0.2447 a 0.2102 a 0.1858 a
  Textiles 0.3358 a 0.3237 a 0.2553 a 0.2461 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.1916 a 0.1872 a 0.1080 a 0.0962 b
  Wood products & furniture 0.2214 a 0.1923 a 0.1450 a 0.1207 a
  Paper 0.2029 a 0.1874 a 0.2896 a 0.2764 a
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.2995 a 0.3013 a 0.3206 a 0.3074 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.2177 a 0.2075 a 0.0972 0.0927
  Basic metals & metal products 0.3425 a 0.3357 a 0.3155 a 0.3076 a
  General machinery 0.4390 a 0.4620 a 0.3476 a 0.3353 a
  Electronic machinery 0.2170 a 0.2230 a 0.2340 b 0.2418 b
  Transportation machinery 0.2988 a 0.2758 a 0.4979 a 0.4808 a
JV-private, 11 industries 0.2605 a 0.2492 a 0.2718 a 0.2543 a
  Food & beverages 0.1672 a 0.1687 a 0.2039 a 0.1768 a
  Textiles 0.3599 b 0.3311 b 0.2260 b 0.2250 b
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.1350 a 0.1229 b 0.0999 0.0942
  Wood products & furniture 0.2462 a 0.2232 a 0.1422 c 0.1113
  Paper -0.8096 -0.8791 0.0799 0.0476
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.3352 a 0.3371 a 0.4785 a 0.4688 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 0.2561 a 0.2485 a 0.2354 b 0.2281 b
  Basic metals & metal products 0.3285 a 0.3162 a 0.4695 a 0.4485 a
  General machinery 0.3144 a 0.3184 a 0.1608 0.1416
  Electronic machinery 0.5908 a 0.5812 a 0.3721 b 0.3715 b
  Transportation machinery 0.3101 a 0.2760 a 0.4089 a 0.3556 b
Test WF-priv=JV-priv, 11 indus. 247.56 a 239.95 a 111.57 a 99.54 a
  Food & beverages 18.26 a 19.09 a 8.34 a 6.36 a
  Textiles 32.04 a 30.99 a 12.58 a 11.75 a
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 27.70 a 27.00 a 4.04 b 3.49
  Wood products & furniture 29.92 a 22.65 a 9.06 a 6.48 a
  Paper 8.22 a 6.57 a 8.09 a 7.32 a
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 56.08 a 56.75 a 50.44 a 49.04 a
  Non-metallic mineral products 15.04 a 13.59 a 3.35 b 3.23 b
  Basic metals & metal products 52.71 a 49.35 a 38.90 a 36.54 a
  General machinery 17.52 a 19.25 a 10.72 a 10.20 a
  Electronic machinery 19.68 a 19.53 a 4.97 a 5.50 a
  Transportation machinery 14.45 a 12.57 a 18.44 a 17.42 a
Differential, industry
2007
Lagged Contem-poraneous
Table 7: Industry-level OLS estimates of ownership-related wage differentials from 
estimates of equation (1) ; all p-values based on robust standard errors
Lagged
2009
Contem-
poraneous
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SOE-private, 11 industries 0.0974 a 0.0864 a 0.1456 a 0.1289 a
  Food & beverages 0.2021 a 0.1989 a 0.2111 a 0.1869 a
  Textiles 0.0022 -0.0061 -0.0877 -0.1119
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 0.0837 b 0.0621 0.0785 0.0534
  Wood products & furniture -0.0536 -0.0948 -0.0747 -0.0912
  Paper 0.1722 0.1624 -0.0051 -0.0675
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 0.2129 a 0.2129 a 0.4090 a 0.3941 a
  Non-metallic mineral products -0.0138 -0.0292 -0.0086 -0.0183
  Basic metals & metal products 0.0755 0.0652 0.2322 a 0.2088 a
  General machinery 0.1126 0.1188 0.0612 0.0680
  Electronic machinery 0.2410 a 0.2337 a 0.3393 b 0.3509 b
  Transportation machinery 0.0278 0.0234 0.2353 a 0.2195 a
Notes: a=signficant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 
10% level; ; see Appendix Table 3  for other slope coefficients and indicators; full results 
including all coefficients and equation details are available from the authors.
Table 7 (continued)
Differential, industry 2009 2007Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
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Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 11 sample industries 1,239,236 357,645 1,047,385 148,857 1,347,540 310,052 1,320,188 143,227
  Food & beverages 238,522 49,858 45,254 20,875 286,290 38,925 52,697 25,812
  Textiles 61,577 34,213 49,520 6,921 62,786 20,829 55,204 3,195
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 367,003 78,407 583,782 52,445 376,043 58,959 726,102 44,695
  Wood products & furniture 174,483 20,401 97,545 8,125 176,407 12,812 116,657 7,416
  Paper 36,468 9,037 11,483 465 39,193 7,994 15,167 425
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 82,318 38,724 55,795 9,220 94,447 32,824 77,708 7,205
  Non-metallic mineral products 129,437 44,624 12,166 10,829 151,327 41,263 13,836 9,528
  Basic metals & metal products 76,947 26,924 37,397 6,345 82,546 30,426 53,257 6,401
  General machinery 22,173 7,297 9,309 614 23,824 7,888 11,314 722
  Electronic machinery 22,494 11,614 111,449 9,803 20,272 9,841 154,058 9,244
  Transportation machinery 27,818 36,548 33,686 23,218 34,408 48,293 44,189 28,586
Excluded industries and firms 196,129 108,658 181,356 4,792 263,814 64,775 188,568 6,699
Appendix Table 1: Paid employees in sample firms by ownership and industry (number) 
2007 2009
Note: Firms with viable data are those with positive paid workers, output, worker compensation, and fixed assets; samples 
exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, and 
recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
11 sample industries 12.852 22.096 21.625 35.323 14.490 22.705 22.309 27.873
 Food & beverages 11.631 22.294 18.500 31.050 14.898 22.974 27.304 27.992
 Textiles 11.281 15.297 18.235 19.924 11.705 16.377 19.000 21.540
 Apparel, leather, & footwear 12.124 12.648 15.031 15.044 12.533 14.438 17.482 16.281
 Wood products & furniture 11.280 14.555 17.286 16.778 11.535 13.678 17.927 19.888
 Paper 12.554 19.794 18.364 28.949 14.420 23.242 23.230 13.718
 Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 14.676 32.765 34.277 48.460 17.133 31.105 28.456 31.868
 Non-metallic mineral products 12.032 20.593 17.082 39.813 14.097 25.062 23.540 29.115
 Basic metals & metal products 14.663 22.575 23.767 37.454 16.526 22.531 24.029 31.796
 General machinery 16.310 21.632 16.069 29.205 18.297 24.136 24.046 23.407
 Electronic machinery 16.087 30.318 44.431 46.397 20.106 30.078 22.396 43.588
 Transportation machinery 14.631 25.306 15.395 39.145 17.631 20.885 21.883 30.320
Appendix Table 2: Mean compensation per worker in sample firms by ownership and industry (million dong) 
2007 2009
Note: Firms with viable data are those with positive paid workers, output, worker compensation, and fixed assets; 
samples exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, 
petroleum products, and recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 11 sample industries 228,883 98,974 198,516 108,795 279,493 87,859 274,504 117,349
  Food & beverages 86,418 24,034 37,709 20,737 98,369 16,143 55,790 28,673
  Textiles 7,946 4,679 14,326 1,283 8,952 2,986 16,566 859
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 16,110 6,496 37,311 4,768 17,271 4,395 49,026 3,626
  Wood products & furniture 16,251 2,623 12,006 1,621 20,633 1,693 15,527 1,730
  Paper 6,992 2,798 3,987 157 10,162 2,481 6,171 210
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 25,909 17,336 21,527 12,373 31,122 17,201 35,188 6,019
  Non-metallic mineral products 15,814 15,287 3,409 9,115 18,567 13,129 3,456 7,933
  Basic metals & metal products 29,087 6,218 13,518 8,460 43,090 10,697 16,876 9,593
  General machinery 3,746 1,149 3,500 188 4,801 1,425 4,503 337
  Electronic machinery 11,286 7,362 35,923 12,071 12,274 6,685 51,263 11,396
  Transportation machinery 9,321 10,992 15,302 38,022 14,253 11,025 20,137 46,973
 Excluded industries 45,181 28,857 26,111 3,727 101,516 28,289 41,354 5,662
Appendix Table 3: Sales of sample firms by ownership and industry (trillion dong)
2007 2009
Note: Firms with viable data are those with positive paid workers, output, worker compensation, and fixed assets; samples 
exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, and 
recycling. 
30
Industry Privatefirms SOEs WFs JVs
Private
firms SOEs WFs JVs
 11 sample industries 7,665 531 1,699 326 7,611 517 2,249 322
  Food & beverages 1,353 115 145 55 1,337 104 164 59
  Textiles 366 31 153 17 416 28 191 11
  Apparel, leather, & footwear 878 46 363 41 871 45 489 40
  Wood products & furniture 1,145 36 168 29 1,245 28 224 32
  Paper 470 17 62 2 445 17 76 2
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics 850 59 287 51 764 54 406 44
  Non-metallic mineral products 921 81 39 29 1,062 78 59 30
  Basic metals & metal products 1,010 44 187 43 880 55 267 46
  General machinery 242 19 51 6 196 19 63 7
  Electronic machinery 196 28 123 26 169 29 159 25
  Transportation machinery 234 55 121 27 226 60 151 26
 Excluded industries 1,767 278 545 43 3,400 177 717 50
Appendix Table 4: Number of sample firms by ownership and industry
2007 2009
exclude firms with less than 20 employees; excluded industries are tobacco, publishing and printing, petroleum products, and 
recycling. 
Source: Author's compilations from General Statistics Office (2011, 2013).
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Food and beverages
KI 0.0109 0.604 0.0296 0.027 0.0878 0.000 0.0322 0.009
RO 0.1808 0.000 0.1541 0.000 0.2064 0.000 0.1445 0.000
SH 0.0123 0.000 0.0124 0.000 0.0181 0.000 0.0181 0.000
SM 0.0002 0.872 0.0002 0.870 -0.0022 0.228 -0.0021 0.241
SF -0.0019 0.011 -0.0020 0.006 -0.0031 0.000 -0.0030 0.000
SP 0.0039 0.001 0.0039 0.001
DW 0.2413 0.000 0.2447 0.000 0.2102 0.002 0.1858 0.005
DJ 0.1672 0.009 0.1687 0.008 0.2039 0.002 0.1768 0.009
DS 0.2021 0.000 0.1989 0.000 0.2111 0.000 0.1869 0.001
Test DW=DJ 18.26 0.000 18.21 0.000 8.34 0.001 6.36 0.003
Obs./R2 1,664 0.499 1,664 0.497 1,668 0.433 1,668 0.426
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
Textiles
KI 0.0465 0.130 0.0249 0.105 0.0461 0.103 0.0324 0.072
RO 0.1636 0.000 0.1244 0.000 0.2006 0.000 0.1128 0.000
SH 0.0152 0.001 0.0145 0.001 0.0254 0.000 0.0255 0.000
SM -0.0007 0.633 -0.0008 0.605 0.0023 0.373 0.0025 0.336
SF -0.0022 0.064 -0.0023 0.051 -0.0020 0.082 -0.0020 0.079
SP 0.0044 0.026 0.0045 0.025
DW 0.3358 0.000 0.3237 0.000 0.2553 0.000 0.2461 0.000
DJ 0.3599 0.013 0.3311 0.019 0.2260 0.020 0.2250 0.016
DS 0.0022 0.976 -0.0061 0.932 -0.0877 0.366 -0.1119 0.243
Test DW=DJ 32.04 0.000 18.21 0.000 12.58 0.000 11.75 0.000
Obs./R2 646 0.483 646 0.480 567 0.468 567 0.460
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Apparel and leather products
KI 0.0050 0.734 -0.0070 0.458 0.0368 0.063 -0.0006 0.963
RO 0.1729 0.000 0.1179 0.000 0.1811 0.000 0.1175 0.000
SH 0.0041 0.130 0.0042 0.118 0.0123 0.002 0.0126 0.002
SM -0.0020 0.206 -0.0019 0.218 -0.0015 0.317 -0.0012 0.408
SF -0.0032 0.001 -0.0031 0.001 -0.0012 0.322 -0.0012 0.329
SP 0.0039 0.019 0.0037 0.028
DW 0.1916 0.000 0.1872 0.000 0.1080 0.004 0.0962 0.011
DJ 0.1350 0.010 0.1229 0.019 0.0999 0.162 0.0942 0.19
DS 0.0837 0.044 0.0621 0.133 0.0785 0.132 0.0534 0.3
Test DW=DJ 27.70 0.000 18.21 0.000 4.04 0.049 3.49 0.104
Obs./R2 1,445 0.391 1,445 0.386 1,328 0.281 1,328 0.2726
No. DI s 1 1 1 0
20072009
Appendix Table 5: OLS Estimates of Ownership-Related Wage Differentials and Other Slope 
Coefficients; all p-values based on robust standard errors
Contem-
poraneous
Contem-
poraneousLagged Lagged
not available
not available
not available
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Wood products and furniture
KI 0.0550 0.001 0.0192 0.091 0.0535 0.002 0.0193 0.086
RO 0.2611 0.000 0.1561 0.000 0.1916 0.000 0.1496 0.000
SH 0.0092 0.003 0.0081 0.010 0.0121 0.000 0.0119 0.000
SM 0.0003 0.854 0.0003 0.827 0.0030 0.027 0.0030 0.024
SF -0.0053 0.000 -0.0053 0.000 -0.0052 0.000 -0.0051 0.000
SP 0.0084 0.000 0.0089 0.000
DW 0.2214 0.000 0.1923 0.000 0.1450 0.000 0.1207 0.000
DJ 0.2462 0.000 0.2232 0.000 0.1422 0.057 0.1113 0.130
DS -0.0536 0.378 -0.0948 0.127 -0.0747 0.399 -0.0912 0.297
Test DW=DJ 29.92 0.000 18.21 0.000 9.06 0.000 6.48 0.000
Obs./R2 1,529 0.477 1,529 0.460 1,378 0.385 1,378 0.379
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Paper products
KI 0.0757 0.031 0.0094 0.642 0.0516 0.117 0.0123 0.501
RO 0.1201 0.000 0.1513 0.000 0.2713 0.000 0.1739 0.000
SH 0.0080 0.003 0.0089 0.001 0.0124 0.000 0.0133 0.000
SM -0.0001 0.977 0.0004 0.850 0.0019 0.299 0.0016 0.339
SF 0.0002 0.888 0.0004 0.756 -0.0015 0.193 -0.0013 0.257
SP 0.0030 0.109 0.0029 0.116
DW 0.2029 0.000 0.1874 0.001 0.2896 0.000 0.2764 0.000
DJ -0.8096 0.195 -0.8791 0.202 0.0799 0.413 0.0476 0.656
DS 0.1722 0.160 0.1624 0.191 -0.0051 0.977 -0.0675 0.721
Test DW=DJ 8.22 0.000 18.21 0.000 8.09 0.000 7.32 0.001
Obs./R2 540 0.417 540 0.404 551 0.415 551 0.401
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
Chemical, Rubber and Plastics
KI -0.0085 0.617 0.0005 0.964 0.0355 0.096 0.0081 0.469
RO 0.1302 0.000 0.1275 0.000 0.2266 0.000 0.1362 0.000
SH 0.0101 0.000 0.0101 0.000 0.0150 0.000 0.0145 0.000
SM 0.0017 0.101 0.0017 0.095 0.0019 0.066 0.0019 0.060
SF -0.0015 0.013 -0.0015 0.013 -0.0008 0.239 -0.0008 0.279
SP 0.0040 0.000 0.0040 0.000
DW 0.2995 0.000 0.3013 0.000 0.3206 0.000 0.3074 0.000
DJ 0.3352 0.000 0.3371 0.000 0.4785 0.000 0.4688 0.000
DS 0.2129 0.001 0.2129 0.001 0.4090 0.000 0.3941 0.000
Test DW=DJ 56.08 0.000 18.21 0.000 50.44 0.000 49.04 0.000
Obs./R2 1,268 0.528 1,268 0.528 1,247 0.513 1,247 0.506
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
Appendix Table 5 (continued)
2009 2007
not available
not available
not available
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Non-metallic mineral products
KI -0.0356 0.014 -0.0247 0.013 -0.0122 0.592 -0.0111 0.408
RO 0.2591 0.000 0.1956 0.000 0.2441 0.000 0.1966 0.000
SH 0.0090 0.000 0.0086 0.000 0.0114 0.053 0.0113 0.056
SM -0.0027 0.001 -0.0026 0.002 0.0017 0.247 0.0017 0.267
SF -0.0027 0.000 -0.0026 0.000 -0.0037 0.000 -0.0037 0.000
SP 0.0054 0.000 0.0058 0.000
DW 0.2177 0.000 0.2075 0.000 0.0972 0.263 0.0927 0.294
DJ 0.2561 0.000 0.2485 0.000 0.2354 0.013 0.2281 0.014
DS -0.0138 0.785 -0.0292 0.570 -0.0086 0.868 -0.0183 0.726
Test DW=DJ 15.04 0.000 18.21 0.000 3.35 0.036 3.23 0.040
Obs./R2 1,229 0.503 1,229 0.496 1,070 0.504 1,070 0.501
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Basic metals & metal products
KI 0.0240 0.261 0.0105 0.409 0.0183 0.283 0.0106 0.343
RO 0.1481 0.000 0.1154 0.000 0.1898 0.000 0.1277 0.000
SH 0.0083 0.000 0.0081 0.000 0.0077 0.003 0.0077 0.003
SM 0.0003 0.682 0.0003 0.600 0.0012 0.203 0.0012 0.199
SF -0.0047 0.000 -0.0047 0.000 -0.0047 0.000 -0.0047 0.000
SP 0.0010 0.345 0.0010 0.339
DW 0.3425 0.000 0.3357 0.000 0.3155 0.000 0.3076 0.000
DJ 0.3285 0.000 0.3162 0.000 0.4695 0.000 0.4485 0.000
DS 0.0755 0.140 0.0652 0.201 0.2322 0.000 0.2088 0.001
Test DW=DJ 52.71 0.000 18.21 0.000 38.90 0.000 36.54 0.000
Obs./R2 1,248 0.386 1,248 0.384 1,284 0.336 1,284 0.331
No. DI s 3 3 3 3
General machinery
KI -0.0645 0.303 -0.0442 0.022 0.0535 0.077 0.0132 0.512
RO 0.0434 0.390 0.1012 0.000 0.1500 0.002 0.1491 0.000
SH 0.0057 0.002 0.0059 0.001 0.0134 0.000 0.0133 0.001
SM 0.0028 0.010 0.0028 0.011 0.0017 0.138 0.0018 0.122
SF -0.0073 0.000 -0.0075 0.000 -0.0054 0.000 -0.0054 0.000
SP 0.0031 0.043 0.0031 0.040
DW 0.4390 0.000 0.4620 0.000 0.3476 0.000 0.3353 0.000
DJ 0.3144 0.010 0.3184 0.008 0.1608 0.446 0.1416 0.496
DS 0.1126 0.164 0.1188 0.140 0.0612 0.573 0.0680 0.533
Test DW=DJ 17.52 0.000 18.21 0.000 10.72 0.000 10.20 0.000
Obs./R2 285 0.447 285 0.441 318 0.442 318 0.438
No. DI s 0 0 0 0
not available
not available
not available
Appendix Table 5 (continued)
2009 2007
Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
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Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val. Value P-val.
Electronic machinery
KI -0.0011 0.980 0.0052 0.799 0.0570 0.397 0.0441 0.190
RO 0.1213 0.000 0.0820 0.000 0.0351 0.385 0.0632 0.016
SH 0.0083 0.000 0.0081 0.000 0.0175 0.000 0.0176 0.000
SM 0.0005 0.752 0.0005 0.745 0.0046 0.002 0.0045 0.003
SF -0.0042 0.001 -0.0043 0.000 -0.0030 0.009 -0.0030 0.010
SP 0.0036 0.097 0.0037 0.090
DW 0.2170 0.000 0.2230 0.000 0.2340 0.018 0.2418 0.020
DJ 0.5908 0.000 0.5812 0.000 0.3721 0.019 0.3715 0.014
DS 0.2410 0.005 0.2337 0.006 0.3393 0.016 0.3509 0.013
Test DW=DJ 19.7 0.000 18.2 0.000 5.0 0.008 5.5 0.004
Obs./R2 382 0.437 382 0.435 373 0.347 373 0.346
No. DI s 4 4 4 4
Transportation machinery
KI -0.0143 0.608 -0.0586 0.000 0.0108 0.811 -0.0412 0.146
RO 0.1471 0.000 0.1089 0.000 0.1885 0.000 0.1193 0.000
SH 0.0050 0.017 0.0046 0.029 0.0114 0.004 0.0118 0.004
SM 0.0019 0.087 0.0020 0.075 0.0006 0.741 0.0006 0.755
SF -0.0031 0.008 -0.0030 0.009 -0.0053 0.002 -0.0055 0.001
SP 0.0013 0.327 0.0016 0.221
DW 0.2988 0.000 0.2758 0.000 0.4979 0.000 0.4808 0.000
DJ 0.3101 0.000 0.2760 0.001 0.4089 0.005 0.3556 0.012
DS 0.0278 0.619 0.0234 0.677 0.2353 0.004 0.2195 0.008
Test DW=DJ 14.5 0.000 18.2 0.000 18.4 0.000 17.4 0.000
Obs./R2 462 0.431 462 0.424 437 0.376 437 0.368
No. DI s 1 1 1 1
Note: in the Obs./R2 rows, the coefficient column contains the number of observations and the P-
value column contains the R-squared; all estimates include 5 regional dummies; see the text for 
definitions or region and industry dummies; the Test DFs rows show Wald tests of the hypothesis 
that coefficients on DW and DJ are equal and associated p-values; and full results including the 
constant and all dummy coefficients are available from the authors.
Appendix Table 5 (continued)
2009 2007
Lagged Contem- Lagged Contem-
not available
not available
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Industry name VSIC Categories included
Manufacturing Sum or Mean of 11 sample industries and excluded industries below
 11 sample industries Sum or Mean of 11 sample industries below
  Food & beverages VSIC 15
  Textiles VSIC 17
  Apparel, leather, & footwear VSIC 18 & 19
  Wood products & furniture VSIC 20 & 361
  Paper, printing, & publishing VSIC 21
  Chemicals, rubber, & plastics VSIC 24 & 25
  Non-metallic mineral products VSIC 26
  Basic metals & metal products VSIC 27 & 28 
  General machinery VSIC 29
  Electronic machinery VSIC 30,31,32 &33
  Transportation machinery VSIC 34 & 35
 Excluded industries VSIC 16, 22, 23, 369 & 37
Appendix Table 6: VSIC Categories included in each industry group
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Applendix Table 7: Nominal minimum wages per month in Vietnam, 2000-2010 (thousand dong)
Year 2000-01 2002 2003-04 2005 2006-07 2008 2009 2010
Domestic firms
 Region 1 620 800 980
 Region 2 580 740 880
 Region 3 540 690 810
 Region 4 540 650 730
MNEs 2006-07 2008 2009 2010
 Region 1 870 1000 1200 1,340
 Region 2 790 900 1080 1,190
 Region 3 710 800 950 1,040
 Region 4 710 800 920 1,000
Notes: 
(3) Regions are defined as follows:
Region 1 : Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
Sources: Vietnamese government degrees compiled by Nguyen (2014, p. 52).
180 210 290 350 450
(2) Region-specipfic, minimum wage rates did not change for MNEs in 2000-05.
Region 2 : Hai Phong, Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Ba Ria Vung Tau, Quang Ninh, Da Nang, and Can 
Region 3 : Other provinces.
Region 4 : Bac Kan, Binh Phuoc, Dak Nong, Lai Chau, and Tay Ninh.
2000-2005
626
556
487
487
(1) Minimum wage rates were uniform for all domestic firms regardless of firm location in 2000-07.
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